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I present a simple model of intra-household allocation between spouses to show that when the 
quantity of resources available to the household is not perfectly observed by both spouses, hiding of 
income can occur even when revelation of the additional resources increases bargaining power. 
From  the  model,  a  test  to  identify  income  hiding  empirically  is  derived.  For  the  empirical 
application, a household survey conducted in Southern Ghana is used. I exploit the variation in the 
degree  of  asymmetric  information  between  spouses,  measured  as  the  difference  between  the 
husband’s own reporting of farm sales and the wife’s reporting of his farm sales, to test whether the 
allocation of resources is consistent with hiding. For identification, the wife’s clan and the husband’s 
bride-wealth  payments  upon  marriage  are  used  as  instruments  for  asymmetric  information.  My 
findings indicate that allocations are suggestive of men hiding farm sales income in the form of gifts 
to extended family members, which are not closely monitored. It is unclear whether hiding has 
negative  consequences  in  the  long  run  because  hiding  occurs  in  the  form  of  gifts,  instead  of 
expenditure in alcohol or tobacco. If the gifts represent a form of risk-sharing, then these gifts will 
return to the household in the future, and hiding is not necessarily inefficient. However, if these gifts 
are motivated by social pressure then hiding can result on poverty traps caused by kin system. The 
wife’s response is also suggestive of hiding. As information asymmetries increase, she reduces her 
expenditure in non-essential items, such as prepared foods and oil, but increases personal spending. 
Expenditure in oil is one of the main sources of calories among poor households in the region.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
Models of household bargaining generally treat the household as a single decision-making unit, or 
assume  household members are able to make binding commitments and have full  information. 
These models predict as a result that intra-household allocation of resources will be efficient. Even 
when households are unable to commit to binding agreements, it is often argued that, because 
families involve long-term, repeated interaction and caring, household members will realize there are 
opportunities for Pareto improvement and therefore cooperation will evolve over time (Browning 
and Chiappori, (1998); Manser and Brown, (1980); McElroy and Horney, (1981)). Furthermore, 
because bargaining power is partially determined by each spouse’s relative amount of resources, 
hiding of income can be argued to be unlikely.  
Recent empirical evidence, however, has documented inefficient allocations (Udry, (1996)) 
and non-cooperative behavior as a result of asymmetric information (Chen (2009); de Laat (2009); 
Ashraf, (2009)). Migration introduces information asymmetries between household members as the 
migrant spouse cannot perfectly monitor her spouse’s behavior, and this can lead to inefficient 
allocation of resources. Chen (2009), drawing data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey, 
finds that after the father migrates, girl’s household labor increases, though child schooling and 
health, which are easily monitored, are unaffected by migration. De Laat (2008), using a survey 
conducted among households living in two Nairobi slums, finds that efficiency losses exist as a 
result of migrants’ need to invest in monitoring.  
However, households living under the same roof can be subject to information asymmetries 
as well (Pahl (1983; 1990); Boozer et al. (2009); Bursztyn and Coffman, (2010)), and the literature on 
the response of household members to having informational advantages over own income is scarce. 
Ashraf (2009) conducts field experiments in the Philippines to examine the effect of the information 2 
 
environment  on  savings decisions  among  married  couples.  She  finds  that  when  husbands  have 
private information over their own resources, they deposit the money into their private accounts, 
while committing the money to consumption (gift cards) when resources are observed by their 
wives,  even  when  husbands  can  decide  privately  how  to  allocate  the  money.  Because  Ashraf’s 
experiments vary the information and communication environment between spouses, no inferences 
can be made regarding the prevalence of asymmetric information outside of the laboratory, nor can 
we observe the way the money deposited in the husband’s private account is allocated.   
Asymmetric information  over expenditure and income between household members has 
important policy implications. When spouses choose to exploit their information advantages by 
hiding income, they must allocate resources away from goods that can easily be monitored, which 
can result in underinvestment in household goods. Generally, child human capital investments, such 
as education and nutrition, are easily monitored. These investments have important spillover effects 
in a household’s ability to step out of poverty because they increase child productivity later in life, 
providing further sources of income diversification to the household (Duflo, (2001); Rosenzweig, 
(1990)).  Further,  household  surveys  where  expenditure  and  income  of  the  entire  household  is 
reported by one spouse are commonly used for poverty measurement. However, when imperfect 
information  flows  exist  between  household  members  over  resources,  reporting  of  expenditures 
other than one’s own is unreliable. 
I  first  derive  a  test  to  formally  identify  hiding  of  income  empirically  through  a  simple 
theoretical model. In the first stage, the husband receives income from two different plots: the farm 
income from the first plot is common knowledge to both spouses, while the second is not observed 
by his wife. He must decide whether to reveal the unobservable income or to hide it. In the second 
stage, spouses negotiate over the allocation of observable resources between private consumption 
and household good expenditure (child expenditures). In deciding to reveal or hide income, the 3 
 
husband faces a trade-off between increasing his own discretionary spending and increasing  his 
bargaining power. If he hides the unobservable income, the husband may spend the entire amount 
without influence from his spouse. But, public goods are observable by both spouses. Therefore, if 
the  husband  is  to  successfully  hide  his  additional  income,  he  can  spend  it  only  on  private 
consumption, which is unobservable. Conversely, if he reveals, he can increase his influence over 
intra-household  allocation  decisions,  but  his  income  will  effectively  be  taxed  via  the  bargaining 
process. In equilibrium, hiding occurs if household bargaining is cooperative and the change in 
bargaining power is not significant enough to compensate for the loss in discretionary expenditure. 
To determine whether the information asymmetries that exist between spouses over farm 
income result in hiding, a household survey conducted in 4 villages in Southern Ghana between 
1996 and 1998 is used. Among agricultural households in Ghana, each spouse farms multiple plots 
making farm income difficult to monitor. Further, the anthropology literature has documented that 
Ghanaian  men  and  women  maintain  separate  economies,  with  a  gender-based  division  of 
responsibilities for different type of expenditures (Chao, (1998); Vercruijsse et al. (1974)). The notion 
of spouses having different spheres of income and expenditure, however, does not necessarily imply 
that  they  will  behave  non-cooperatively,  making  Ghana  an  excellent  place  to  examine  spousal 
behavior in the presence of asymmetric information. Additionally, the extended kin group in Ghana 
is  the  institution  around  which  social  organization  revolves,  and  for  matrilineal  groups,  ―an 
individual’s allegiance to the lineage often overrides any other loyalty and, as such, conjugal ties are 
considered less important than lineal blood ties‖ (Takyi and Gyimah, (2007)).  
For the empirical application, I exploit the variation in the degree of asymmetric information 
between spouses, measured as the difference between the husband’s own reporting of his farm sales 
and the wife’s reporting of her husband’s farm sales. Among the households in the survey these 
differences are on average equivalent to a fourth of mean household expenditure. The differences in 4 
 
reporting of income between spouses constitute only one of the components required to identify 
hiding. Hiding further requires for the husband to have expenditure alternatives that are also not 
monitored by his wife. In this study, I examine the effect of asymmetric information over farm 
income on the husband’s gifts to extended family members, which are not easily monitored, as well 
as on adult clothing, food expenditure, and wife’s personal spending, all of which are observed by 
the wife. For identification, the wife’s clan and the husband’s bride-wealth payments upon marriage 
are used as instruments for asymmetric information. In Ghana, clan membership can influence the 
husband’s decision to reveal his unobservable income because among matrilineal clans in particular, 
the husband comes third in the wife’s ranking of her affective relationships (Robertson, (1984), and 
also because women in matrilineal clans have more initial bargaining power since they are able to 
own assets and have access to social support such as access to land. The payment of bride-wealth, 
on the other hand, influences asymmetric information differently depending on the clan the wife 
belongs to. Among matrilineal clans, bride-wealth is less likely to be returned upon divorce, thus the 
husband has an incentive to reveal less information about his income to his wife in order to recoup 
his initial investment in the event of the termination of the marriage.  
The econometric results indicate that expenditures of these households are consistent with 
hiding of the husband’s income. Husbands hide farm sales income in the form of gifts to extended 
family members. These gifts are not observable by his wife because she would have to be familiar 
with  her  husband’s  family  spending  patterns  in  order  to  become  suspicious.  But  even  if  she 
suspected, the strength of the lineage blood ties would prevent the husband’s family from revealing 
the source of their additional resources. Asymmetric information has no effect on adult clothing or 
public transportation. Because hiding occurs in the form of gifts, instead of expenditure in alcohol 
or tobacco, it is unclear whether hiding has negative consequences in the long run. If the gifts 
represent a form of risk-sharing, then these gifts will return to the household in the future, and 5 
 
hiding is not necessarily inefficient. However, if these gifts are motivated by social pressure then 
hiding can result on poverty traps caused by kin system (Hoff and Sen, (2005)). The wife’s response 
is also consistent with hiding. As the degree of asymmetric information increases, she reduces her 
expenditure in prepared foods and oil, which are goods that can be substituted for less expensive 
alternatives.  There  is  evidence  that  hiding  results  in  a  reduction  in  child  nutrition  because 
asymmetric information causes a reduction in expenditure in oil, which is one of the main sources of 
calories among poor households in the region. 
 
 
2.  Intra-household Decision-Making in Southern Ghana 
 
It is not the norm for men and women to pool resources in Ghanaian households (Chao, (1998); 
(Clark, 1999)). Women are as economically active as men, and their income is neither a supplement, 
nor it is conceived as part of the family income (Vercruijsse et al. (1974)). The responsibility for day-
to-day maintenance of the family, however, seemed to be shared by both husbands and wives, while 
the majority maintains separate financial arrangements of spending, owning and saving (Oppong, 
(1974)). Oppong (1974) observed that husbands and wives do not own, manage or inherit property 
together
2. She finds that husbands were twice as likely to own property with their kin as with their 
wives, and only ten percent of households had joint accounts.  
Men and women tend t o have separate income and expenditure streams, often with a 
traditional gender-based division of responsibilities for different type of expenditures (Chao, (1998)). 
                                                           
2 Hill (1963) documented that among the Ewe husbands and wives seldom compose a unified production unit, while 
Ashanti women commonly earn their living and inherit property (Guyer, 1981). Further, inter-household relations are 
not simply relations between male heads. Women too have their inter-household exchange networks, and their control 
of their own independent resources enables them to fulfill obligations to family members and kin living elsewhere (in 
Tambiah, et al. (1989)). 6 
 
Generally,  men  are  expected  to  contribute  either  staple  grains  from  their  farms  for  household 
consumption, or ―chop money‖ for food and pay for children’s school fees (Chao, 1998). Women 
bear primary responsibility for childrearing, cooking, washing and collecting fuel, wood and water. 
Thus, additional expenditures for children, such as clothes are met by the women, as well as meal 
preparation and ingredients (Chao, 1998).  
The  extended  kin  group  in  Ghana  is  the  institution  around  which  social  organization 
revolves. The main forms of kinship are the matrilineal and patrilineal  clan systems. Under the 
patrilineal system, property and inheritance rights are passed through the father’s line, whereas under 
matriliny, such rights are transferred through the mother’s line (Takyi and Gyimah, (2007)). For 
matrilineal groups, ―an individual’s allegiance to the lineage often overrides any other loyalty and, as 
such, conjugal ties are considered less important than lineal blood ties‖ (Takyi and Gyimah, (2007))
3. 
Consistent with this belief, u nder the matrilineal family system, married couples rarely pool their 
resources together for   the benefit of the conjugal family unit   (Clark, 1999).  The  practice of 
maintaining separate marital accounts coupled with the allegiance  of the wife to her own maternal 
family could undermine the authority of the husband (Takyi and Gyimah, (2007)).  
Bride-wealth is the term used to refer to the gifts given by the  groom’s family to that of the 
bride upon marriage. It represents each family’s approval of the other and its acceptance formalizes 
the  marriage  contract  (Saml  and  Falola,  (2002)).  In  Ghana,  relocation  after  marriage  is  mostly 
virilocal (Ogbu, (1978)), bride-wealth is thus paid, in part, because marriage effectively involves loss 
of labor to the bride's family (Murdock, (1967)). In these societies, bride-wealth is not transferred to 
the bride in the form of dowry, as in India or China, the bride’s parents keep it (Goody, (1973)), and 
upon divorce bride-wealth will generally have to be returned (Tambiah et al. (1989)).  
                                                           
3 Robertson (1984) states that in Accra, Ghana a woman’s most important affective relationships are usually with her 
mother and her children; her siblings rank next in importance, and her husband in a poor third (pg 182). 7 
 
The relationship between bride-wealth on intra-household decision making differs by lineage 
or clan. Among non-matrilineal groups, divorce is harder to achieve, bride-wealth payments tend to 
be higher, and these are more likely to be returned upon divorce, relative to matrilineal groups 
(Ogbu,  (1978))
4.  Furthermore,  under  the  matrilineal   system  of  descent,  family  members  are 
guaranteed  significant social support   such as access to land ,  not found among non -matrilineal 




3.  Intra-Household Decision-Making under Asymmetric Information 
 
Consider a model with two family members, f and m, who have preferences over consumption of 
one  private  (or personal) good, denoted    ,  and one household public good,   .The household 
resource allocation decision is made in two stages. In the first stage household member m receives 
two forms of income,     which is common knowledge to both spouses and   which is not observed 
by household member f, while household member f receives     which is also common knowledge. 
For the husband, we can think about this as being a result of the allocation of labor hours towards 
two different productive activities, such as farming two different plots of land, or selling prepared 
foods early in the morning and farming later in the day. Household member m distributes the total 
number of hours he allocates towards productive activities between working in a plot whose yields 
can be easily monitored by his wife, such as plots they farm jointly or that are owned by her family, 
                                                           
4 Among the matrilineal clans, if the husband files for divorce, bride-wealth has to be returned. When the wife files for 
divorce, the husband’s custody over children and bride-wealth refund is contingent upon his innocence in the matter. 
Contrastingly, women in patrilineal clans cannot file for divorce, not even in the case of adultery or mistreatment. 
(Ogbu, (1978)). 8 
 
and a plot where income is not easily monitored, such as plots farmed by the husband alone, as well 
as profit from a small or informal business.  
Household member m has to decide whether to reveal the unobserved income to his wife or 
to keep it for private consumption. For simplicity T is assumed to be observable with probability 
zero and it is also assumed that f cannot observe m’s private consumption choices, nor does she 
invest in monitoring m’s income
5, though  f can perfectly infer the presence of additional income 
through  the  public  good  allocation,  which  is  perfectly  observable.  In  the  second  stage,  each 
household member makes his consumption choices conditional on the amount of income spouse m 
revealed.  The  family  decision-making  process  is  solved  by  backwards  induction.  First,  the 
consumption choices conditional on the amount of resources that become known are described, and 
then the circumstances under which it is optimal for m to hide income are determined. 
  Both family members face the same price for private goods which is normalized to 1 (one 
can think about the private good as being money for discretionary expenditure), and p is the price 
for the public good. If both household members pool their income, the joint budget constraint is: 
                                          (1) 
where     is the wife’s overall income. If each member decides to allocate the income at his/her 
disposal separately between private and household public goods, their individual budget constraints 
are: 
                      for i = f,m            (2) 
Preferences over own consumption are represented by an egotistic utility function,   . Utility 
depends on the aggregate level of consumption of household public goods (           ) and 
private goods and it is assumed to be separable in    and  : 
                                                           
5 This assumption is not trivial, but it can be justified if the opportunity cost of spending time monitoring her husband’s 
plot is too high relative to spending time in productive activities of her own, such as working his own land. The model 
can be extended to incorporate both, time allocation decisions and a cost of monitoring. 9 
 
                               for i = f,m        (3) 
The functions      and      satisfy the standard assumptions that       ,       ,        ,        , 
and          .          , implying    and   are normal goods. Both spouses have the same 
functional form for simplicity. The characterization of goods as public or private depends on the 
nature of the good. The household public goods are assumed to be non-rival in utility, so they are of 
the Samuelson type. For instance, a clean house provides utility to both members of the household, 
while food provides utility only to the person who consumed it.  
 
Separate Spheres Bargaining in Ghanaian Households 
 
As noted previously, in Ghanaian households men and women hold separate economies, such that 
no spouse has access to all of the household’s resources, and spending patterns differ by gender. 
Nonetheless, it is generally the case, and so it is observed in the data, for intra-household transfers to 
occur in the form of ―chop money‖, loans and farm produce, particularly from husbands to wives. It 
seems  plausible  to  consider  the  possibility  then  that  either  the  intra-household  allocation  of 
resources is non-cooperative (each spouse controls his/her own resources), or that the fall-back 
alternative  when  household  members  cannot  reach  a  bargaining  agreement  (threat  point) 
corresponds to a non-cooperative equilibrium within marriage where the husband makes positive 
transfers to his wife. In previous literature, this threat point has been of little interest because the 
redistribution of resources between spouses would have no effect on allocations. However, when 
household bargaining is non-cooperative and strictly positive transfers occur between spouses, there 
can be incentives to hide unobservable resources.  
In  this  section,  I  examine  the  incentives  to  hide  when  household  bargaining  is  non-
cooperative; when there is gender specialization in the household, such that the husband is in charge 10 
 
of providing money, while the wife specializes in the provision of the public good. I draw from the 
Lundberg and Pollak (1993) separate spheres model.  Consistent with Ghanaian households, the 
marital contract states that the husband must pay for children’s school fees and provide chop money 
to his wife
6. Thus, upon marriage the husband makes a binding commitment to pay for school fees, 
and these are fixed. This assumption is not unrealistic given that the households in the sample live in 
very small villages  and it is unlikely that they have many schooling choices . The  housekeeping 
allowance (or chop money), s, however, is chosen by the husband. The marital contract stipulates 
that he must provide for his wife, though it does not specify the amount. The wife, on the other 
hand, chooses the household good allocation (Q). The wife’s household good can be thought of as 
child expenditures other than school fees, such as clothing and other schooling expenses, as well as 
fuel  or wood,  and  ingredients to prepare food  for  all  members of the  household. In this case 
spouses do not commit to any binding agreements.  
The game consists of 3 stages: in the first stage, the husband (m) receives both sources of 
income (    and  ) and chooses whether to reveal the unobservable income     or to hide it. In the 
second stage, he chooses the housekeeping allowance (s) he will give his wife (f); and in stage three, 
the wife decides the public good provision conditional on both T and s. The model is solved by 
backwards induction. In the benchmark case, i.e. when T is revealed, spouse f solves the following 
optimization problem, 
                                                          
7      (4)  
Substituting in the budget constraint, the First-Order condition for Q is 
                                             (5) 
                                                           
6 Among the Akan and the Ashanti, the wife can file for divorce in the case lack of economic support by her husband 
(Ogbu, (1978)). Husbands are also expected to pay for school fees (Chao, (1998)). 
7 Technically, the utility function is given by:                     but since the schooling fees are assumed fixed, it 
does not affect the outcomes. One can also think about     as being the husband’s disposable income after paying for 
school fees. 11 
 
Conducting comparative statics on the above condition yields, 
  
    
             
                                         (6) 
So, the housekeeping allowance is the husband’s way to increase his household good consumption, 
but the correspondence is not one-to-one. Note that, the public good allocation will be strictly 
positive, thus equation (5) holds with equality. 
Taking spouse f’s first-order condition as given, spouse m solves: 
                                  
                                                               (7)  
The Lagrangian is: 
                                                         
which yields the following Kuhn-Tucker first-order conditions, 
  
                                                       (8) 
  
                                                       (9)  
  
                                             (10)  
  
  
       ,   
  
       ;   
  
       ;      ;       
 
Solving  the  system  of  first-order  conditions  simultaneously  yields  the  Subgame  Perfect  Nash 
equilibrium. There is a corner solution where the housekeeping allowance can be non-positive, as 
well  as  an  interior  solution.  Proposition  1  specifies  the  conditions  that  must  be  met  for  an 
equilibrium with a strictly positive housekeeping allowance to exist. 
 12 
 
Proposition 1: Given        , there exists a          in the interval         such that if                    a corner 
solution with       and       is possible. 
 
Following  Proposition  1,  if                            ,  it  is  optimal  for  m  to  give  a  non-positive 
housekeeping allowance to f. Proposition 2 states the properties of the equilibrium with respect to 
changes  of  income  for  both  cases,  and  provides  the  foundations  as  to  why  when  household 
bargaining is non-cooperative there are no incentives for the husband to hide income. 
 
Proposition 2: When spouses behave non-cooperatively and all income is revealed:  
Case (i) If                           ,       and      , then an increase in     results in 
   
   
     
  




   
 
   
   
   , while an increase in     or T results in 
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Case (ii) If                   ,        , then an increase in     results in  
   
   
     
  
   
    
   
   
     
  
   
    
while an increase in     or T results in 
   
    
 
   
        
  
    
 
  
       
  
    
 
  
       
   
    
 
   
        
 
If spouse m is not giving a positive housekeeping allowance to f, changes in husband’s resources 
have no impact on f’s allocations. Now consider the case when m receives income that is observable 
to household member f with probability zero. If the distribution of income is such that          
                , hiding is indistinguishable from non-cooperative behavior under perfect information 13 
 
because  in  both  cases  a  change  in  m’s  resources  only  impacts  m’s  allocations
8.  This is intuitive 
because when all sources of cooperation and interaction fail between household members, the 
information asymmetries become irrelevant. 
In the case where                   , it is m’s best response to give a strictly positive housekeeping 
allowance to f in order to increase his household good consumption. In this case, an increase in m’s 
resources increases his discretionary expenditure and his housekeeping allowance, and therefore the 
provision of the public good. However, it also increases f’s private consumption. Thus in this case 
there could be incentives to hide income. To decide whether to reveal or to hide, m compares the 
utility per unit change of T in both cases. 
 
Proposition 3: Given     and     when                   , the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the game is to 
always reveal.  
 
Propositions 2  and 3 imply that when household bargaining is non-cooperative,  i.e.  when they 
manage their resources independently, the husband does not hide income in equilibrium. When 
allocations  default  to  separate  spheres  and  no  intra-household  transfers  occur,  information 
asymmetries  over  household  income  are  irrelevant.  If  strictly  positive  transfers  occur  between 
household members, the husband is better off revealing his unobservable income. This contrasts 
with the case where the wife receives income that is unobservable to her husband, where hiding is 
the equilibrium if the unobservable income does not exceed a certain threshold (in Castilla, (2010)).  
 
Collective Bargaining 
                                                           
8 There exists another case that is not being examined in this paper, corresponding to when T is such that, if revealed, it 
makes the interior equilibrium possible. In that case, comparisons cannot be made on the margin because the baseline 
utility is not the same across cases. 14 
 
 
But  what  happens  if  household  bargaining  is  cooperative?  If  household  allocations  are  fully 
cooperative, differences in the observability of two sources of income would have no effect on 
allocations. In this case, even when the wife is unable to observe her husband’s resources, he would 
reveal them directly or indirectly through expenditure. However, there exists the possibility of partial 
cooperation, where the husband is cooperative with respect to the allocation of observable income, 
but depending on the responsiveness of bargaining power to the revelation of additional income, he 
could choose to allocate the unobservable resources at his discretion. Thus, in deciding to reveal or 
hide income, the husband faces a trade-off between increasing his own discretionary spending and 
increasing his bargaining power. I model this case drawing from the Browning and Chiappori (1998) 
collective  bargaining  model,  where  household  members  bargain  over  all  allocations,  and  it  is 
assumed  they  can  negotiate  binding  agreements  with  zero  transaction  costs.  The  information 
asymmetry is introduced by allowing a portion of spouse m’s income (T) to be observable with 
probability zero.  
  The collective bargaining game is solved by backwards induction, so first I find the optimal 
public good allocation and private expenditure shares conditional on the amount of income that is 
revealed, and then derive the conditions that must be met for m to reveal the transfer. In the second 
stage, the objective function of the collective household is the bargaining power weighted sum of 
each member’s utility: 
                                                   (11) 
Where                    is the bargaining power of spouse m and                        is the 
bargaining power of spouse f. This is the weight given to each spouse’s utility in the household 
welfare function when bargaining, and it is partially determined by each spouse’s outside options, as 
well  as  by  resources  originally  brought  into  the  marriage  and  distribution  factors  (z).  The 15 
 
unobservable income only influences bargaining power when it is revealed, such that       if m 
reveals, and       if he hides. I do not specify a functional form in order to avoid making further 
assumptions about the  relative  weights additional resources would  have over other factors that 
influence bargaining power, but are unaffected by changes in the quantity of resources. Thus, the 
bargaining weight is used as a generic way to incorporate the existence of an outside option if 
spouses fail to reach a bargaining agreement (threat point). Consistent with both non-cooperative 
equilibria within marriage and divorce threat points, income increases m’s bargaining power. 
The  collective  household’s  problem  when  income  is  fully  revealed  is  to  maximize  (11) 
subject  to  the  aggregate  budget  constraint  (1).  I  solve  the  collective  model  assuming  that  the 
participation constraints do not bind, i.e. assuming that both spouses are better off cooperating than 
under the threat points
9.  
         
                                                   
                                                                  
     (12) 
 
The Kuhn-Tucker first-order conditions of the problem in (12) are: 
  
                                                       
  
   
                                                   
  
  
      ;     
  
   
     ;                      (13) 
Solving this system yields the demand for the household public good and the demand for private 
consumption. The optimal demands respond to changes in aggregate income (i.e. income pooling 
feature) and to changes in individual income through its resulting changes in bargaining power.  
 
                                                           
9 This is not a strong assumption given that spouses are bargaining over all allocations, such that the public good 
provision will be efficient (at least when all income is revealed).  16 
 
Proposition 4: An increase in the husband’s (wife’s) income increases the public good allocation and his (her) 
private expenditure, whereas it may increase or decrease the wife’s (husband’s) private expenditure depending on which, 
the income effect or the bargaining power effect is larger.  
 
When spouse m hides his unobservable income, in order to avoid detection he must allocate it all 
towards  private  consumption  which  is  unobservable.  Spouses  bargain  over  public  and  private 
consumption given only the resources that are common knowledge, i.e.            , such that 
household good consumption and f’s private consumption does not respond to changes in T. In the 
second stage, spouse m compares the change in utility per unit change in the unobservable income 
when it is revealed to when it is hidden. The equilibrium conditions are stated in Proposition 5. 
 
Proposition 5: Given    ,     and T, there exists a strictly positive threshold change in bargaining power          such 
that for any 
  
              hiding is the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium iff 
      
               
                   
        
        
           
                          
        
          
        
Corollary 1: Given    ,     and T, as   approaches zero, the threshold level of bargaining power         is strictly 
negative, whereas when   tends to 1 it is positive. 
 
Proposition 5 implies that the decision to hide money depends not only on the change in bargaining 
power but on the initial level of bargaining power as well. The threshold level of change required to 
induce revelation is increasing and concave in initial bargaining power. The result is intuitive because 
if  m’s  bargaining  power  is  low,  he  is  less  likely  to  influence  household  allocations  towards  his 
preferences and thus his private consumption is ―taxed‖ more severely, but at the same time, any 
increase in bargaining power makes him better off. Conversely, when bargaining power is high, the 17 
 
public good allocation is going to be close to what he prefers, thus on the margin the benefit per 
unit of income of revelation is not as high.  
 
   18 
 
4.  Indentifying Income-Hiding between Spouses: Empirical Application 
 
In the previous section, it was shown that when household bargaining is non-cooperative and strictly 
positive transfers are observed between spouses, hiding never occurs in equilibrium. The models 
also indicate that income pooling of all of the husband’s income sources is observed when spouses 
behave  non-cooperatively  and  the  husband  makes  strictly  positive  transfers,  as  well  as  when 
household bargaining is collective and hiding does not occur. In Ghana, the marital contract implies 
that strictly positive transfers between spouses take place, and so is observed in the data, thus the 
separate spheres threat point with no marital transfers is irrelevant. 
There are then two ways to test for income-hiding empirically. When information about 
both sources of income of the husband is available, hiding can be identified empirically if there are 
differences in the effect of changes in observable and unobservable income on allocations that are 
not monitored. Pooling of all sources of husband’s income is a feature of the collective household, 
as well as of the non-cooperative household with spousal transfers when hiding is not observed. 
Because hiding never occurs in equilibrium when household bargaining is non-cooperative, rejection 
of pooling of the different sources of income of the husband implies hiding, and not another form 
of non-cooperative behavior. However, different sources of income are not necessarily going to be 
fungible (Duflo and Udry, (2004)), and this test could be confounding hiding with lack of fungibility. 
From Proposition 4 and 5 it can be inferred that if resources are to successfully be hidden, they 
would have to be spent on goods that are not monitored. Therefore in a hiding equilibrium, it 
suffices to find that the wife’s allocations, as well as allocations that are observable do not respond 
to changes in the resources that are unobserved, whereas the allocations that are not monitored do. 
This test of hiding relies only on looking at the effect on allocations of the source of income that is 
not monitored, thus requiring less data. 19 
 
 
Implication 1: Given that T is only observed by spouse m, if    is not observed by spouse f, and   
and    are perfectly observable by spouse f, income hiding occurs if 
   
        and 
  
    
   
      .  
 
The model does not allow differentiating income-hiding from a change in bargaining power because 
spouses need to have preferences towards more than one attributable private good. In that case, a 
change in bargaining power would be accompanied by shifts in all attributable goods favored by that 
spouse, irrespective of the ease with which those goods are monitored (Chen, (2009)). The model 
can easily be extended to show that if there exists more than one private good, expenditures of the 
husband that are not easily monitored will be more responsive to changes in unobservable income 




The data consists of a two year survey of 240 households, drawn from 4 villages in Southern Ghana 
conducted by Udry and Goldstein between 1996 and 1998. The sample was constructed in two 
stages. Four villages were selected such that they were near the towns of Nsawam and Aburi. The 
primary income earning activity of the residents of these villages is agriculture, both in food crops 
(mainly maize and cassava) and export crops (pineapple). However, given the proximity of two of 
these villages to larger towns, a significant number of the respondents in the survey work for pay, own 
a business, or trade. Within each village, 60 married couples (or triples)
10 were randomly selected to be 
interviewed, except in village 3 where all households were interviewed. Single headed households were 
                                                           
10 Some of these households are polygamous. 20 
 
excluded from the sample. Enumerators interviewed the male and female respondents privately. 
Each person was interviewed 15 times during the course of 2 years (Udry and Goldstein, (1999)). 
The unique feature of the survey for the purposes of this paper is that each respondent was 
asked to report on their own expenditure and farm income, and the expenditure and farm income of 
their spouse. The information on expenditure is available for rounds 4, 8 (conducted in 1997), and 
12 (conducted in 1998), and it is reported for the previous 12 months. Data on cross-reporting of 
income is only available for farm sales, and only for the year 1998 (rounds 10 to 15). There is a 
timing mismatch between the rounds where expenditure data was collected (April through June 
1998) and the rounds where farm income was collected (January through August 1998)
11. It would be 
possible to examine if expenditure is stable by examining the previous two rounds. However, one of 
the enumerators consistently underreported expenditure in village 1 during round 4 and 8. Among the 
households that reside in the villages where no underreporting wa s observed,  Goldstein (2004) 
indicates  that expenditure is very stable . Therefore, I rely on the 1998  surveys  and use annual 
expenditure in round 12 and farm sales collected in rounds 10 through 15 for the empirical analysis.  
For data on gifts I use round 11, where each spouse specified the amount of money given in the 
form of gifts and to whom these were given.  
Among the 240 households originally surveyed, 163 are agricultural households. Some of 
these households additionally engage in other economic activities such as businesses, as well as 
casual or formal work for pay. I exclude  polygamous households, as well as households where only 
one spouse participates in the survey , the  latter because the information for both spouses  is not 
generally available, and the  former because the intra-household dynamics are structurally different 
relative to monogamous households. After restricting the sample, 130 households are left. Of these, 
125 contain information of husband’s farm income reported by both the husband and the wife. 
                                                           
11 The two main farming seasons are in December and then May through July. The January round covers the months of 
December and January. 21 
 
Cross-reporting of wife’s farm income is not used because only 31 households contain information 
on  both  cross-reporting  of  wife’s  farm  income  and  cross-reporting  of  husband’s  farm  income. 
Finally, 107 of these report information on expenditure, as well as the instruments required for 
identification, such that no out-of-sample inferences can be made. 
 
Empirical Approach and Identification Strategy 
 
Reduced-form demand equations of household attributable expenditure of both the husband and 
the  wife  are  estimated.  Implication  1  stated  that  to  test  for  hiding  it  suffices  to  find  that 
unobservable  income  has  a  significant  effect  on  expenditure  that  is  not  monitored,  while  no 
significant effect on observable expenditure. The husband’s farm sales are difficult to monitor by the 
wife because in these households, men farm 5 plots on average, and women farm their own plots. 
Thus, the cost of acquiring information about her husband’s sales includes, both the direct time cost 
associating with monitoring and the opportunity cost of farming her own plots.  
Among  the  households  in  the  sample,  the  information  asymmetries  over  farm  sales  are 
considerable (see Table 1), though relying solely on farm sales would not be taking advantage of the 
full extent of asymmetric information
12. Thus, in the empirical analysis I exploit the variation in the 
difference between the husband’s own reporting of his farm sales and the wife’s reporting of his 
farm sales. Expenditure is then estimated as a function of the information asymmetry over farm 
sales, such that identification rests on the comparison of households as the degree of asymmetric 
information increases.  
For household i in village v, the demand for good g,     
  , is given by: 
  
       
       
       
             
        
 
               (14) 
                                                           
12 Robustness estimates including farm sales reported by the husband are presented in Appendix III. 22 
 
Where     
 
     corresponds to village dummy variables;   
  includes household level variables such 
as years of marriage, number of crops farmed and if they farm pineapple, total area of plots, an 
indicator of whether one member of the household has a business or works for pay, number of 
household members, of boys and girls, and number of members under 5 years of age, between 5 and 
14, and over 60, total household income, and husband’s share of household income;   
  includes the 
wife’s  education  level  and  age,  while    
   includes  the  husband’s  education  level  and  age. 
Additionally, for each spouse, an indicator of the number of plots that were harvested solely by each 
spouse is included as a control for monitoring, and to extract some of the measurement error in the 
differences in cross-reporting of the husband’s farm sales. 
  Asymmetric information is measured as the difference in the husband’s reporting of his farm 
sales minus his wife’s reporting of his farm sales. Depending on the wife’s beliefs, there can be over-
reporting  and  under-reporting,  though,  in  either  case,  differences  in  cross-reporting  indicate 
information asymmetries
13. The asymmetry is then defined as the absolute value of the difference in 
reporting. The resulting value is normalized by the average farm sales reported by the husband. 
     
   
              
              
    
 
             
     
   
          (16) 
However,  there  exists  the  possibility  that  there  is  a  certain  norm  of  acceptable  information 
asymmetry  between  spouses  in  Ghanaian  societies.  To  account  for  this,  I  use  the  standardized 
asymmetry in the empirical analysis, though in Appendix III results on the normalized asymmetry 
are also presented. 
        
   
     
       
             
 
        
       
              
            (17) 
There are two reasons why the degree of asymmetric information is endogenous: farm sales 
can be reported with error, and observed asymmetric information in 1998 could be the result of 
                                                           
13 In the results section, I also restrict the sample only to households where the wife underestimates her husband’s 
income as a check for robustness. 23 
 
previous bargaining outcomes. To address this I instrument for asymmetry using clan membership, 
the amount of bride-wealth payments, and interaction of the two.  
        
         
           
         
         
       
       
       
        
 
         (18) 
Where    
  is the amount given by the husband’s family in gifts to the wife’s family upon marriage, 
or bride-wealth; and      
  is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the wife speaks Akwapim or Twi, 
and 0 otherwise. The amount reported of bride-wealth is deflated using the consumer price index 
obtained from the World Development Indicators. For spouses that married before 1964, the 1964 
consumer price index is used because information is unavailable for previous years. Lineage or clan 
membership is identified using language or dialect. For the most part, dialects are highly correlated 
with clan except in the case of those speaking Akan. In 1978 the Akan Orthography Committee 
established a common orthography for all of Akan dialects, now called Akan (proper) which is used 
as the medium of instruction in primary school by speakers of several other Akan languages. The 
Akan people are of both matrilineal and patrilineal descent, thus those speaking Akan have the 
potential to be of a non-matrilineal clan. The Akwapim (or Akwapem), speak Akwapim or Twi, and 
are matrilineal. Of the households considered in this paper, 58% speak Akwapim or Twi, while the 
rest speak Ewe (12.5%), Akan (19.5%) or other (10%). If indeed some of the households that speak 
Akan are matrilineal, the indicator as I defined it would attenuate the effect of clan membership on 
asymmetric information. A detailed description of all the variables can be found in Appendix II. 
  In Ghana, clan membership influences information asymmetries because among matrilineal 
clans in particular, the allegiance to the lineage overrides any other loyalty, including conjugal ties 
(Takyi, and Gyimah, (2007)). Robertson (1984) finds that the husband is third in the wife’s ranking 
of her affective relationships. Further, women in matrilineal clans have more initial bargaining power 
since they are able to own assets and have access to social support such as access to land. From the 24 
 
model we know that lower initial bargaining power of the husband results in a lower threshold 
change in bargaining power required to induce revelation, and thus less asymmetric information. 
The payment of bride-wealth, on the other hand, gives the husband rights over his wife 
(Schneider,  (1964)  in  Takyi  and  Gyimah,  (2007)),  but  it  is  also  a  significant  transfer  of  wealth 
between families. Among matrilineal clans, bride-wealth is less likely to be returned upon divorce, 
and the payments are smaller; thus the husband has an incentive to reveal less information about his 
income to his wife in order to recoup his initial investment in the event of the termination of the 
marriage. Contrastingly, among patrilineal clans bride-wealth is most likely returned upon divorce 
and the payments are larger; thus the husband has no incentives to keep money from his wife 
because he knows he will recoup his investment in the event of termination of the marriage.  
  Farm sales and the wife’s reporting of her husband’s sales are likely to be measured with 
error, though the differences cannot be entirely attributed to measurement error. Using the same 
data, Boozer et al. (2009) show that the differences in reporting of expenditure across household 
members  is  partially  due  to  measurement  error,  but  also  indicative  of  asymmetric  information. 
Nonetheless, the use of instruments should take care of the endogeneity caused by measurement 
error, such that we are left with the proportion of the differences that are not pure error. Note that 
under measurement error the estimates of the first stage equation are inefficient, implying that the 




Table 1 and Table 2 include descriptive statistics of household and spouse’s monthly attributable 
expenditures. Average monthly expenditure in child clothing and utilities is very similar representing 
between 2 and 3 percent of total expenditure, while schooling fees correspond to close to 6 percent. 25 
 
These households devote almost half of their expenditure to food, spending 14 percent in protein. 
Non-essential food items such as oil and prepared food (or fufu) represent 1.7 and 5.5 percent 
respectively of household expenditure. In what follows some of these items will be important in 
evaluating whether the wife’s expenditure choices are consistent with the reporting of her beliefs 
about her husband’s farm income.  
 
 
The information on chop money is only used as a reference for comparison. The average chop 
money  amount  given  from  husband’s  to  wives  59  thousand  Cedis.  The  husband’s  attributable 
expenditure considered throughout the paper correspond to public transportation, clothing and gifts 
to his family (excluding children and his wife, or previous wives), while for the wife I consider 
personal  expenses  instead  of  gifts.  In  all  cases,  these  expenditures  are  reported  by  the  person 
disbursing the money. On average, men spend almost 4 times as much on public transportation than 
women,  which  is  consistent  with  men  being  the  main  economic  support  of  the  household, 
contributing on average almost 75% of household income. Clothing expenditure however is very 
Table 1:
Descriptive Statistics on Household Expenditure
Variable Mean Std. Dev % of HH 
Income
% of Total 
Exp.
Household Expenditures
Schooling 1.87 4.52 0.95 5.70
Child Clothes 0.86 1.32 0.44 2.62
Utilities 0.70 0.96 0.36 2.13
Oil 0.56 1.07 0.28 1.70
Protein 4.59 4.02 2.34 14.00
Food Expenditure
Total Prep Food 1.81 2.40 0.92 5.53
Wife Prep. Food 1.02 1.71 0.52 3.10
Husb. Prep. Food 0.794 1.465 0.405 2.426
Total Food 15.38 10.99 7.84 46.97
Total Expenditure 32.75 27.03 16.70 100.00
Note: Monthly expenditure in thousands of Cedis.
Note: % of total expenditure excluding own farm consumption.26 
 
similar, with each spouse spending on average almost as much on herself as on children’s clothing. 
The wife’s personal expenses are not very significant, accounting for less than 1% of household 
expenditure. The husband’s gifts to his family however are significantly large, ranging from zero to 
270 thousand Cedis per month. To put this in perspective, those gifts are almost equivalent to the 
monthly amount of chop money that he gives his wife. The way these gifts are defined indicates they 
are not funeral expenses, nor weddings, and they are not loans either, such that these gifts will not 
be returned.  
 
 
Table 3 contains information of the amount of the husband’s farm sales and his wife’s reporting of 
these. The average of farm sales income reported by the husband is twice as large as the average 
sales reported by his wife, suggesting a very significant degree of asymmetric information. The mean 
absolute difference is even larger because 27 wives overestimate their husband’s farm income. The 
difference  in  cross-reporting  accounts  for  14%  of  total  household  income,  and  18%  of  the 
husband’s income. 
Table 2:
Descriptive Statistics on Spousal Attributable Expenditure
Variable Mean Std. Dev % of HH 
Income
% of Total 
Exp.
Husband's Attributable Expenditure
Husb. Public Transp. 1.446 4.166 0.737 4.416
Husb. Clothes 0.779 1.227 0.397 2.380
Chop Money 59.099 52.115 30.136 -
Husb. Gifts 53.935 64.801 27.502 -
Wife's Attributable Expenditure
Wife Personal Exp. 0.134 0.196 0.068 0.409
Wife Public Transportation 0.387 0.657 0.198 1.183
Wife Clothes 0.614 1.082 0.313 1.876
Note: Monthly expenditure in thousands of Cedis.




Table 4 contains information of farm sales by clan. Most of the households in the survey are of 
matrilineal (Akwapim) descent (57%). Consistent with the literature, average bride-wealth payments 
in households where the wife is of matrilineal descent are almost one fourth of the amounts paid for 
non-matrilineal wives. While husband’s of wives of matrilineal or non-matrilineal descent report 
similar amounts of monthly farm sales, the wife’s beliefs of her husband’s farm income in matrilineal 
clans are almost half of what the wives in non-matrilineal clans report on average. However, the 
absolute difference in reporting of the husband’s farm sales across clan membership is very similar
14.  
                                                           
14 The number of wives that overestimate their husband’s farm sales is evenly distributed across clans. 
Table 3:
Descriptive Statistics on Spousal Attributable Expenditure
Variable Mean Std. Dev % of HH 
Income
Farm Sales and Asymmetric Information
Abs (Hus - Wife) 28.74 56.85 14.65
Wife's Report of 
Husband's Sales
15.09 37.39 7.70
Husband's Report of 
Husb. Sales
31.63 63.04 16.13
Total HH Sales 33.43 63.26 17.05
Spousal Income
Husb. Income 160.24 287.25 81.71
Wife Income 35.87 68.52 18.29
Husband's Share of 
Income
0.74 0.31 -
Total HH Income 196.11 316.36 100.00
Note: Monthly expenditure in thousands of Cedis.




5.  Econometric Results 
 
The data indicates that information asymmetries over farm income exist within spouses among the 
households  in  the  survey.  However,  incomplete  information  will  not  always  result  in  hiding. 
Implication 1 indicates that hiding can be identified empirically if the asymmetric information over 
farm sales has no effect on observable expenditure, while it has a significant effect on expenditure that is 
not  monitored.  In  what  follows,  results  are  shown  on  the  estimates  of  the  reduced-form  demand 
equations for expenditure on observable household goods such as children’s clothing, schooling and 
utilities, as well as goods attributable to either the husband or the wife. The wife’s expenditures include 
clothing, commuting, and personal items. I also consider expenditure in food items such as oil and 
prepared foods, which for the most part are in the wife’s sphere of responsibilities, but that will also 
provide information about her beliefs regarding their availability of resources.  
Table 4:
Descriptive Statistics Farm Sales and Bridewealth by Wife's Clan
Obs  Mean  Std. Dev. Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.
Bride-wealth                          
(Millions of Cedis)
45     8,794.39     29,737.70  62    2,717.75      7,584.24 
Abs Diff. Husband Sales           
(thousands of Cedis)
45          28.76            59.24  62         28.72           55.54 
Standarized Abs. Diff. 
Husband Sales
45 -0.03 1.01 62 -0.03 0.95
Household Total Sales               
(thousands of Cedis)
45          36.50            66.92  62         31.20           60.93 
Husband Total Sales                 
(thousands of Cedis)
45          34.97            66.96  62         29.20           60.47 
Wife's Belief Husband Sales                         
(thousands of Cedis)
45          20.51            49.14  62         11.17           25.49 




For the husband, commuting and clothing expenditures are considered, as well as the gifts 
granted to his family members other than his children, wife or previous wives
15. Both commuting 
and clothing are considered to be observable by  the wife, while the gifts are not. Clothing is easily 
monitorable, while commuting perhaps less so, but since these households live in small villages, the 
cost of monitoring of transportation expenditures by the wife is low . The gifts to his family  are 
much harder to monitor because the money effectively leaves their household, and she would need 
to have a very good idea of the regular spending patterns of her husband’s family in order to 
become suspicious. But even in that case, she would not easily learn that it is her husband who is 
providing them with money, particularly given that their allegiance is stronger towards their kin, 
which would make the husband’s family unlikely to reveal the source of their additional resources. 
Table 5 contains the results. 
The first column corresponds to the estimation results for equation (18). These results are 
consistent with the arguments presented earlier. The degree of asymmetric information over the 
husband’s  farm  income  is  decreasing  in  bride-wealth  among  households  with  wives  of  non-
matrilineal descent, while it is increasing in bride-wealth for households with wives of matrilineal 
clans. The instruments are statistically significant individually, except for the case of the dummy 
variable indicating clan membership, and they are all jointly significant at the 95% confidence level. 
The value of the F-statistic is small,  suggesting the instruments are weak. This can partially be 
attributed to measurement error in both husband’s farm sales and the wife’s reporting of his sales, 
which results in larger standard errors. To account for this, weak instrument robust endogeneity 
tests are used. The J-test for over-identifying restrictions in all cases fails to reject the null, such that 
at  least  one  of  the  instruments  is  exogenous  (except  for  the  wife’s  public  transportation 
expenditure). The weak instrument robust LM test for the coefficient on asymmetric information in 
                                                           
15 The definition of gifts is money given to individuals other than the husband’s children, wife or previous wives, and 
that is not going to be returned. Thus, these do not include loans. Also, these do not include gifts to in-laws. 30 
 
the second stage being equal to zero is also reported. Additionally, most of the equations being 
estimated are Tobits, in which case the use of maximum likelihood ameliorates the consequences of 




It can be observed in Table 5 that the degree of asymmetric information over farm sales has a 
significant, large and positive effect on gifts given to the husband’s extended family. This result is 
indicative of hiding because gifts are not easily monitored. Even though the effect is statistically 
significant  only  at  the  93%  confidence  level,  it  is  significant  in  magnitude  since  one  standard 
deviation  increase  in  the  asymmetry,  on  average,  increases  gifts  in  more  than  half  the  average 
Table 5
















Clan                                                               
(=1 if Matrilineal Clan)
-0.366                     
(0.243)
- - - - - -
Bridewealth                                              
(Millions of 1998 Cedis)
-0.005**                    
(0.002)
- - - - - -
Clan * Bridewealth                                                  
(Millions of 1998 Cedis)
0.049**                    
(0.019)
- - - - - -
Asymmetry Husband's Farm Y                                
(Std. Dev. from Mean) -
-2.635*                    
(1.572)
-0.057                     
(0.731)
48.65*                    
(27.98)
0.323                     
(0.773)
0.169                     
(0.458)
0.119**                    
(0.053)
No. Plots of Husband Harvested 
by Husband 
0.070                     
(0.055)
0.236                     
(0.226)
0.016                     
(0.115)
1.710                     
(4.647)
0.090                     
(0.060)
0.186**                    
(0.094)
0.011                     
(0.013)
No. Plots of Wife Harvested by 
Wife 
-0.268**                    
(0.109)
-1.406*                    
(0.794)
-0.428                     
(0.288)
16.56*                    
(9.659)
0.002                     
(0.167)
0.137                     
(0.175)
0.032                     
(0.028)
Weak Instruments F-test 3.96** - - - - - -
LM-Test (WI Robust) - 2.49 0.01 2.68* 0.21 2.38 0.08
J-Test (WI Robust) - 0.33 0.33 1.27 8.71 0.4 0.86
N 107 107 107 107 107 107 107
Note: Robust Standard errors in parentheses. All models are estimated using Tobits to account for censoring. 
Note: These estimates inlcude all control variables. Full results in Appendix III.
Note: Montly expenditures in 1998 thousands of cedis.
*** p-value<0.001, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1
Husband Assignable Expenditure Wife's Assignable Expenditure
Variable First Stage31 
 
monthly amount of chop money transferred from husbands to wives. This result is also robust when 
using the weak instrument LM test. 
In  Section  2,  when  the  collective  model  was  discussed,  it  was  argued  that  in  deciding 
whether  to  reveal  or  to hide  his  unobservable  income  the  husband  was  faced  with a  trade-off 
between increasing his bargaining power and deciding what to do with the unobservable resources 
without  influence  from  his  wife.  Expenditure  in  public  transportation  makes  the  husband 
presumably better off since otherwise he would have to walk to work (particularly since none of 
these households owns vehicles). The significant and negative effect of asymmetric information on 
public  transportation  expenditure  suggests  that  relative  to  households  where  the  wife  is  better 
informed of her husband’s farm income, husbands that are keeping information from their wives are 
giving up bargaining power as a result of hiding. Both the negative effect on public transportation, 
and  the  lack  of  significance  of  asymmetric  information  on  the  husband’s  clothing  expenditure 
indicate that the results are not being driven by a shift in bargaining power, given that it would result 
in  an  increase  in  all  allocations  preferred  by  the  husband,  and  because  household  income  is 
controlled for, these are not explained by income effects either. Consistent with the husband giving 
up some bargaining power as a result of hiding, asymmetric information has a slight but significant 
increase on the wife’s personal expenditures. However, these results are not robust to the weak 
instruments LM test. 
Interestingly, asymmetric information has a negative and significant effect on expenditure in 
oil and prepared foods. The magnitude is also considerably large, as it is around the average daily 
amount of chop money for the case of prepared foods. The wife is responsible for these non-
essential expenditures, such that when she believes her husband has less money, she decreases the 
amount of money spent on non-essential goods. Results of the wife’s food expenditures, as well as 




The degree of asymmetric information has no significant effect on household goods that are easily 
monitored,  such  as  child  clothing  and  utilities
16. The magnitude is also small, provided that one 
standard deviation increase in the degree of asymmetric information increases monthly expenditure in 
utilities (wood, fuel, candles) in 200 Cedis, or decreases child clothing expenditure in 322 Cedis, which 
corresponds to between 10 and 13% of the average daily amount of chop money.   Asymmetric 
information over farm sales has no statistically significant effect on schooling and protein expenditure 
(see Appendix II). The magnitude, even though it is larger than the case of children’s clothing and oil, 
is equivalent to half the daily amount of chop money for schooling, and around one fourth for protein. 
                                                           
16 In Appendix III results for schooling expenditures are also presented, where the asymmetry has no effect either. 
These were excluded from the main text given that it is the husband’s obligation to cover school fees and those 
comprise most of the schooling expenditures. 
Table 6:










Clan                                                               
(=1 if Matrilineal Clan)
-0.366                     
(0.243)
- - - - - - -
Bridewealth                                              
(Millions of 1998 Cedis)
-0.005**                    
(0.002)
- - - - - - -
Clan * Bridewealth                                                  
(Millions of 1998 Cedis)
0.049**                    
(0.019)
- - - - - - -
Asymmetry Husband's Farm Y                                
(Std. Dev. from Mean) -
-1.189                     
(2.684)
-0.395                     
(0.452)
0.193                     
(0.367)
-1.160**                    
(0.579)
-0.666                     
(1.229)
-2.086**                    
(0.943)
-2.774**                    
(1.357)
No. Plots of Husband Harvested 
by Husband 
0.070                     
(0.055)
-0.200                     
(0.343)
0.262**                    
(0.112)
0.068                     
(0.057)
0.118                     
(0.113)
0.354                     
(0.242)
0.027                     
(0.165)
-0.042                     
(0.212)
No. Plots of Wife Harvested by 
Wife 
-0.268**                    
(0.109)
-0.565                     
(0.810)
0.158                     
(0.206)
-0.111                     
(0.163)
-0.192                     
(0.184)
-0.053                     
(0.447)
-0.661**                    
(0.313)
-0.975**                    
(0.423)
Weak Instruments F-test 3.96** - - - - - - -
LM-Test (WI Robust) - 0.3 0.36 0.2 4.91** 0.24 6.65** 6.96**
J-Test (WI Robust) - 2.32 0.95 1.55 2.19 1.1 1.37 1.43
N 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 107
Note: Robust Standard errors in parentheses. All models are estimated using Tobits to account for censoring. 
Note: These estimates inlcude all control variables. Full results in Appendix III.
Note: Montly expenditures in 1998 thousands of cedis.
*** p-value<0.001, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1
Variable First Stage





Asymmetric information is measured as the absolute differences of the husband’s reporting of his 
farm  sales  minus  his  wife’s  reporting.  The  negative  differences  indicate  that  the  wife  is 
overestimating her husband’s sales. There are 80 households where this difference is either zero 
(indicating perfect information) or positive, whereas 27 are negative. The absolute value of the 27 
negative observations does not affect the range or the distribution of the indicator of asymmetric 
information, as shown in Figure 1. Nonetheless, the concern remains that these observations could 
be driving the afore-presented results, in which case it would not make sense to say that the wife, for 
instance, reduces the expenditure in oil and prepared foods because she believes they have less 
money. For this reason, in Table 7 I restrict the sample to only the households that reported zero or 
positive differences. The results on husband’s gifts, wife’s expenditure in prepared foods, oil and in 
personal  items  remain  unaffected.  Husband’s  expenditure  in  public  transportation  is  no  longer 
significant, though this could be due to the loss in degrees of freedom when further restricting an 
already small sample.  
  In further robustness checks, results using the husband’s farm sales, as well as the absolute 
differences in cross-reporting of the husband’s farm sales (normalized by the average difference) to 
identify income-hiding were obtained. The estimates on prepared food and oil expenditure, as well 
as the wife’s personal expenses and gifts to the husband’s family are robust. This suggests the above-
presented  results  are  not  being  driven  by  households  in  which  the  wife  is  overestimating  her 
husband’s farm income, nor by the preferred indicator of asymmetric information. Further, the 
husband’s farm sales do not significantly impact all of the husband’s expenditures, and they have a 
significant effect on expenditures of the wife. This is inconsistent with spouses behaving completely 34 
 
non-cooperatively,  in  which  case  the  wife’s  expenditures  would  not  be  affected  by  husband’s 




Even though I conducted weak instrument robust tests for over-identifying restrictions that 
fail to reject the null of all of the instruments being exogenous, it is possible that bride-wealth and 
clan could influence household allocations. Both bride-wealth payments, as well as lineage are related 
to the threat of divorce. A wife of matrilineal descent has a greater support network, in which case the 
repayment of bride-wealth upon divorce is not as strong of a reason to stay in a troubled marriage. 
Further, among matrilineal clans the wife is able to file for divorce and contingent on the husband 
being proven guilty, bride-wealth repayment could be forfeited or significantly reduced.  
In  what  follows  I  present  evidence  to  support  that  the  channel  of  influence  of  these 
instruments  on  allocations  is  through  the  incentives  to  hide  income.  To  do  so,  I  estimate  the 
Table 7:






















Clan                                                               
(=1 if Matrilineal Clan)
-0.508                     
(0.404)
- - - - - - - - -
Bridewealth                                              
(Millions of 1998 Cedis)
-0.005**                    
(0.002)
- - - - - - - - -
Clan * Bridewealth                                                  
(Millions of 1998 Cedis)
0.050**                    
(0.021)
- - - - - - - - -
Asymmetry Husband's Farm Y                                
(Std. Dev. from Mean) -
-0.640                     
(0.421)
-1.478*                    
(0.756)
-1.785*                    
(1.041)
-1.271                     
(0.963)
0.623                     
(0.768)
63.39*                    
(34.93)
0.500                     
(0.695)
0.592                     
(0.508)
0.177**                    
(0.066)
No. Plots of Husband Harvested 
by Husband 
0.085                     
(0.061)
0.255**                    
(0.113)
0.164                     
(0.134)
-0.033                     
(0.189)
0.116                     
(0.156)
-0.028                     
(0.134)
0.549                     
(5.970)
0.056                     
(0.075)
0.173                     
(0.114)
-0.001                     
(0.011)
No. Plots of Wife Harvested by 
Wife 
-0.328**                    
(0.127)
-0.203                     
(0.176)
-0.319                     
(0.278)
-0.729*                    
(0.433)
-0.298                     
(0.416)
0.157                     
(0.334)
26.73*                    
(14.81)
0.084                     
(0.252)
0.234                     
(0.268)
0.073**                    
(0.037)
Weak Instruments F-test 3.34**
N 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80
Note: Robust Standard errors in parentheses. All models are estimated using Tobits to account for censoring. 
Note: These estimates inlcude all control variables. Full results in Appendix III.
Note: Montly expenditures in 1998 thousands of cedis.





reduced-form demand equations presented above as a function of the standardized indicator of 
asymmetric information without instrumentation. I then obtain the residuals from these equations 
and regress them on the indicator of clan, bride-wealth and the interaction of the two. This is not a 
formal test for exogeneity given that it relies on the choice of functional form, but it does provide 
additional evidence that conditional on asymmetric information over farm income, these variables 
are not correlated with the unexplained variation in expenditure. The results in Table 8 indicate that 
the instruments are uncorrelated with the residuals obtained from the expenditure equation in all 
cases (except for the expenditure on prepared foods). While clan is significantly correlated with the 
unexplained variation in prepared foods expenditure, bride-wealth and the interaction between them 
is not, and the F-statistic is small and insignificant, suggesting that there is at least one instrument 
that is exogenous. 
 
Table 8:
Results, Residuals of Expenditure as a function of Instruments




Schooling 0.842                 
(0.682)
-0.004                 
(0.016)
0.016                 
(0.063)
0.68 -0.009
Children's Clothes -0.016                 
(0.227)
-0.001                 
(0.005)
-0.003                 
(0.021)
0.04 -0.029
Utilities 0.231                 
(0.178)
-0.000                 
(0.004)
0.010                 
(0.016)
0.89 -0.003
Wife's Prepared Food 0.493*               
(0.241)
0.005                 
(0.005)
-0.029                 
(0.020)
1.69 0.019
Wife's Personal Exp. 0.036                 
(0.031)
-0.000                 
(0.000)
0.002                 
(0.002)
0.91 -0.003
Wife's Public Transp. 0.209*               
(0.109)
-0.000                 
(0.002)
0.005                 
(0.009)
1.71 0.020
Wife's Clothing 0.128                 
(0.171)
0.001                 
(0.004)
-0.002                 
(0.014)
0.19 -0.024
Husband's Pub. Transp 0.605                 
(0.616)
0.000                 
(0.015)
0.022                 
(0.057)
0.48 -0.016
Husband's Clothing 0.066                 
(0.230)
-0.001                 
(0.005)
0.006                 
(0.021)
0.09 -0.027
Husband's Gifts -8.902                 
(10.90)
-0.288                 
(0.268)
0.387                 
(0.932)
0.51 -0.014
Note: Robust Standard errors in parentheses. 
Note: Montly expenditures in thousands of cedis. Bride-wealth in millions of Cedis.
*** p-value<0.001, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.136 
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
I presented a model of intra-household allocation between spouses to show that income-hiding can 
occur in equilibrium when the change in bargaining power associated with revelation of resources is 
not significant enough to overcome the loss in discretionary expenditure. From the model a test to 
identify  hiding  empirically  was  developed.  Among  the  households  in  the  survey,  there  exist 
significant  information  asymmetries  over  the  husband’s  farm  income,  however  asymmetric 
information will not necessarily result in hiding. To empirically identify income-hiding, I exploited 
the variation in the differences in reporting of the husband’s farm income by himself and his wife as 
an  indicator  of  asymmetric  information.  For  identification,  clan  and  bride-wealth  were  used  as 
instruments for asymmetric information. 
Findings  indicate  the  allocation  of  resources  in  the  Ghanaian  households  considered  is 
suggestive of income-hiding. The husband’s threat of hiding farm sales income in the form of gifts 
to extended family members, which are not closely monitored, is credible. The wife’s response is 
consistent with either hiding being a credible threat, or with retaliation on her part as a response to 
the expectation that her husband will allocate a significant (though unknown) amount of resources 
towards  these  gifts.  As  the  degree  of  asymmetric  information  increases,  the  wife  reduces  her 
expenditure in prepared foods and oil, but increases personal spending. The results on husband’s 
gifts, the wife’s prepared food, oil and personal expenditure are robust to restricting the sample to 
households where the wife underestimates her husband’s farm income, as well as considering farm 
income instead of the differences in observability of farm income. The results are consistent with 
the anthropology literature in the sense that the husband’s allegiance to his kin overrides conjugal 
ties,  as  the  effect  of  asymmetric  information  over  farm  sales  is  significant  statistically  and  in 
magnitude. Further, it is unclear whether hiding has negative consequences in the long run. If the 37 
 
gifts represent a form of risk-sharing, then these gifts will return to the household in the future, and 
hiding is not necessarily inefficient. However, if these gifts are motivated by social pressure then 
hiding can result on poverty traps caused by kin system. 
 
 
Appendix I: Proofs 
 
Non-Cooperative Bargaining (Separate Spheres):  
 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
Let Q=0, then (5) implies: 
                                        (P1.1) 
But by assumption          , so (5) binds and Q>0. 
 
Equation (9) implies that s=0 for some Q>0 as long as: 
                                            (P1.2) 
 
Which only holds iff      . We have shown that (5) binds, therefore the constraint on m’s problem 
binds as well, so      . Since Q>0, from (8) we know: 
                                                  (P1.3) 
 
given the concavity assumption, is only possible if      . 
If            , (P3.2) holds because          .   
                                          (P1.4) 
If              , due to the concavity assumption we know that                       , and from (5) and 
(8) we know that: 
                                                              (P1.5) 
So, 
                                                                 (P1.6) 
So, following from (9), and multiplying (P3.4) by p on both sides: 
                                                                    (P1.7) 
when            , (P1.7) will generally won’t hold, though there exists the possibility of a small 
interval where (P1.7) holds. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
 
Case (i) If                             ,      , such that the value of   is obtained from (5) 
                                           (P2.1) 
Differentiating (P2.1) and f’s budget constraint with respect to Yf and T yields the results stated in the 
proposition.  38 
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Case (ii) If                   ,.        .  
Solving (8) and (9) for   and substituting in, yields the following system for s and Q: 
                                                                                  (P2.8) 
                                
 
Totally differentiating the system in (P2.8): 
 
                                                                                                                                          
                            
    
  
   
 
   
                  
                  
                                  
                               
            
  
    
    
  
   
 
Let D denote determinant of the Hessian which is equal to: 
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Recall from FOC’s:                           
So, the comparative statics are, 
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Proof of Proposition 3: 
Assumptions: 
(i)  Spouse f can observe T with probability zero. 
(ii)  Spouse m’s private consumption, or discretionary expenditure, is not monitored by f.  39 
 
 
If m chooses to reveal T and                the change in utility per unit change in T is given by: 
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Substituting in f’s FOC       
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If m decides to hide then m spends all the unobservable income on private consumption. Thus, the 
change in utility per unit change in the transfer is give by: 
    
    
 
        
                   (P3.2) 
where   
  is the allocation when T is hidden, and   
  is the allocation when T is revealed. Note that 
  
      
 . 
Spouse m hides money from f if and only if 
    
    
 
       
          
         
    
 
                  (P3.3) 
 
Which is never true due to the concavity assumption. Thus in a non-cooperative outcome, even 
when the husband makes positive transfers to his wife, he never hides. 
 
Collective Bargaining 
Proof of Proposition 4: 
 
Totally differentiating the equations in (13) yields the following system of equations: 
 
 
                                         
                                        
  
  
   
 
   
                                                                                           
                                                                                                                       
  
    





Let the determinant of the Hessian be denoted by D, where 
                                                                            (P4.1) 
 
Comparative statics reveal that, 
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Proof of Proposition 5: 
Assumptions: 
(i)  Spouse f can observe T with probability zero. 
(ii)  If revealed, the unobservable income changes bargaining power. 
(iii)  Spouse m’s private consumption is not monitored by spouse f.  
 
Spouse f hides money from m if and only if 
    
    
 
      
    
                  (P5.1) 
 
If m reveals the demands are obtained by solving (12) for T>0: Thus, the change in         per unit 
change in T are equivalent to those corresponding to changes in Yf described in Proposition 4. The 
change in utility per unit change in T is given by: 
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Taking into account FOC’s         
          , and rearranging terms 
    
    
 
 
     
  
                  
        
                         
      
          
  
                
          
     
              
        
                    
        
              
        
     
 
If  m  hides  then  he  allocates  T  towards  private  consumption  and  neither  household  good 
consumption nor f’s private consumption depend on T. Thus, the change in utility per unit change in 
T is give by: 
    
    
 
        
                   (P5.3) 
where    is the optimal bargained private consumption allocation when T is hidden, and   
  is the 
optimal private consumption allocation if it is revealed. 
 
Simplifying the above expression yields the condition that must be met for m to hide T  
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Where, 
          
                
          
                    
        
                    
        
              
        
        
 
A strictly positive threshold change in bargaining power such that m hides exists iff, 
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Taking limit       approaches zero: 41 
 
                
     
        
        
        
   
              
        
           
        
                   (P5.6) 
Taking the limit as  approaches 1:  
                
     
       
        
  
                       
                    
      .             (P5.7) 
implying that whether the threshold is strictly positive depends on initial level of bargaining power.   42 
 
 




Clan Dicotomous variable equal to 1 if the wife speaks Akwapim Twi, and zero otherwise
Bride-wealth
Monetary value in Cedis of the gifts given from the husband's family to the wife's family upon 
marriage, deflated using the consumer price index (CPI) of the year of marriage reported by 
the wife. CPI used was obtained from the World Bank Development Indicators. For marriages 
before 1964, the 1964 CPI was used.
Asymmetric Information 
Husband's Farm Income
Husband's annual farm sales reported by the Husband - Husband's annual farm sales reported 
by the Wife.
No. Plots of Husband, 
Harvested by Husband
Number of plots harvested by the husband alone out of the plots farmed by the husband 
during the year of 1998.
No. Plots of Wife Harvested 
by Wife
Number of plots harvested by the wife alone out of the plots farmed by the wife during the 
year of 1998.
Wife's School Level Dicotomous variable equal to 1 if the wife's school level is secondary or higher, zero if illiterate 
or elementary.
Husband's School Level Categorical variable equal to 1 if illiterate, 2 if elementary, 3 if secondary, 4 if highschool or 
higher.
Number of Household 
Members
Number of household members.
Number of Girls Number of girls living in the household.
Number of Boys Number of boys living in the household.
No. Age <5 Number of members under 5 years of age.
No. 5 < age < 15  Number of members between 5 and 14 years old.
No. 14 < age < 60 Number of members between 15 and 59 yeard old.
No. age > 59 Number of members over 60 years of age.
Years of marriage Number of years spouses have been married.
Wife's Age Age of the wife in years.
Husband's Age Age of the husband in years.
Husband's Share of HH Y Husband's Income divided by the sum of husband's and wife's total income.
Total HH Income
Sum of husband's and wife's total income. This includes farm sales, profit from business, 
wages of work for pay, spouse's sales from own farms, and value of produce from farms used 
for household consumption.
No. Crops farmed Total number of crops farmed during the year. Considers husband's and wife's crops.
Outside Y Dicotomous variable equal to 1 if either husband or wife own a business or work for pay.
Pineapple Dicotomous variable equal to 1 if husband farms pineapple.
Total Area of HH Plots Sum of total area of wife's and husband's plots.
Village 1 Dicotomous variable equal to 1 if household lives in village 1.
Village 2 Dicotomous variable equal to 1 if household lives in village 2.
Village 3 Dicotomous variable equal to 1 if household lives in village 3.43 
 




   
Table 9:
Descriptive Statistics on Household Demographics
Obs Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev
Household Members 107 4.80 1.98 No. Crops 3.81 1.62
No. Girls 107 1.93 1.42 No. Plots of Husb. 
Farmed by Husb.
1.78 1.63
No. Boys 107 2.22 1.64 No. Plots of Wife 
Farmed by Wife
0.38 0.82
No. HH members less 
than 5
107 1.15 0.95 Total Area HH Plots 26.77 25.10
No. HH members age 6 
to 14
107 1.20 1.24 Husb. Income 160.24 287.25
No. HH members over 
60
107 0.16 0.48 Wife Income 35.87 68.52
Years Married 107 12.46 9.67
Husband's Share of 
Income
0.74 0.31
Wife's Age 107 34.75 11.04 Total HH Income 196.11 316.36
Husband's Age 107 40.99 11.21 Bride-wealth 5,273.34       20,230.31    




Distribution of the Information Asymmetry in Husband’s Farm Sales 
Full-sample  Restricted Sample only to Non-negative values 
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Results for the Effect of Asymmetric Information on Household Expenditure
Tot. School
Child 







Clan                                                               
(=1 if Matrilineal Clan)
-0.366                     
(0.243)
- - - - - - - -
Bridewealth                                              
(Millions of 1998 Cedis)
-0.005**                    
(0.002)
- - - - - - - -
Clan * Bridewealth                                                  
(Millions of 1998 Cedis)
0.049**                    
(0.019)
- - - - - - - -
Asymmetry Husband's Farm Y                                
(Std. Dev. from Mean)
- -1.189                     
(2.684)
-0.395                     
(0.452)
0.193                     
(0.367)
-1.160**                    
(0.579)
-0.666                     
(1.229)
-2.086**                    
(0.943)
-3.154                     
(3.430)
-2.774**                    
(1.357)
No. Plots of Husband Harvested 
by Husband 
0.070                     
(0.055)
-0.200                     
(0.343)
0.262**                    
(0.112)
0.068                     
(0.057)
0.118                     
(0.113)
0.354                     
(0.242)
0.027                     
(0.165)
-0.113                     
(0.300)
-0.042                     
(0.212)
No. Plots of Wife Harvested by 
Wife 
-0.268**                    
(0.109)
-0.565                     
(0.810)
0.158                     
(0.206)
-0.111                     
(0.163)
-0.192                     
(0.184)
-0.053                     
(0.447)
-0.661**                    
(0.313)
-0.902                     
(0.855)
-0.975**                    
(0.423)
Wife School Level                                               
(=1 if Secondary or Higher)
-0.274                     
(0.210)
1.129                     
(1.086)
0.459*                    
(0.260)
-0.090                     
(0.198)
-0.025                     
(0.257)
0.237                     
(0.781)
-1.189**                    
(0.561)
-0.834                     
(0.927)
-1.412*                    
(0.738)
Husband School Level                                                 
(=1 if Primary or Illiterate)
-0.700*                    
(0.412)
0.025                     
(2.720)
-0.939                     
(0.609)
0.197                     
(0.439)
-1.532*                    
(0.830)
2.132                     
(1.793)
-2.894**                    
(1.203)
-2.821                     
(2.734)
-3.449**                    
(1.547)
Husband School Level                             
(=1 if Secondary)
-0.476                     
(0.358)
0.354                     
(2.248)
-0.972                     
(0.642)
0.314                     
(0.453)
-1.170*                    
(0.703)
2.336                     
(1.510)
-1.594*                    
(0.861)
-1.367                     
(2.091)
-1.730                     
(1.185)
No. Household Members 0.091                     
(0.112)
1.259*                    
(0.760)
0.220*                    
(0.121)
0.039                     
(0.180)
0.135                     
(0.160)
0.729                     
(0.570)
-0.318                     
(0.290)
0.470                     
(0.556)
-0.069                     
(0.446)
No. Girls -0.221**                    
(0.098)
-1.061                     
(0.783)
-0.088                     
(0.151)
0.022                     
(0.101)
-0.158                     
(0.183)
-0.793*                    
(0.464)
-0.415                     
(0.257)
-0.717                     
(0.797)
-0.680*                    
(0.382)
No. Boys -0.108                     
(0.100)
-1.646**                    
(0.704)
0.035                     
(0.096)
-0.100                     
(0.085)
-0.102                     
(0.150)
-1.032**                    
(0.470)
-0.133                     
(0.225)
-0.430                     
(0.387)
-0.279                     
(0.328)
No. Age < 5 0.101                     
(0.155)
0.023                     
(0.860)
-0.403**                    
(0.184)
-0.124                     
(0.157)
0.005                     
(0.277)
-0.052                     
(0.711)
1.412**                    
(0.503)
0.313                     
(0.603)
1.363**                    
(0.582)
No. 5 < Age < 14 0.244                     
(0.198)
0.342                     
(0.900)
-0.087                     
(0.176)
0.059                     
(0.248)
0.274                     
(0.266)
0.723                     
(0.636)
0.753*                    
(0.419)
0.322                     
(0.851)
0.762                     
(0.595)
No. Over Age 60 0.311                     
(0.196)
-0.303                     
(1.432)
-0.674                     
(0.435)
0.088                     
(0.246)
0.160                     
(0.361)
-0.176                     
(0.994)
0.516                     
(0.666)
0.474                     
(1.484)
0.233                     
(0.917)
Years Married -0.017                     
(0.012)
-0.113                     
(0.087)
-0.022                     
(0.022)
-0.013                     
(0.010)
0.015                     
(0.020)
-0.050                     
(0.051)
0.007                     
(0.030)
-0.002                     
(0.066)
0.021                     
(0.045)
Wife's Age 0.027                     
(0.018)
0.257*                    
(0.139)
-0.000                     
(0.031)
0.004                     
(0.019)
0.032                     
(0.034)
0.214**                    
(0.091)
0.121*                    
(0.065)
0.060                     
(0.096)
0.144*                    
(0.085)
Husband's Age
0.000                     
(0.012)
0.041                     
(0.092)
0.008                     
(0.019)
-0.004                     
(0.009)
-0.020                     
(0.022)
-0.046                     
(0.054)
-0.001                     
(0.034)
0.029                     
(0.047)
-0.000                     
(0.044)
Husband's Share of HH Y 0.105                     
(0.204)
0.632                     
(1.386)
-0.814**                    
(0.391)
0.035                     
(0.200)
-0.312                     
(0.411)
-0.578                     
(1.257)
0.046                     
(0.644)
1.454                     
(1.134)
0.684                     
(0.948)
Total HH Y                                                             
(Thousands of 1998 Cedis)
0.000*                    
(0.000)
0.000**                    
(0.000)
0.000*                    
(0.000)
3.953                     
(3.868)
0.000*                    
(6.111)
0.000*                    
(0.000)
0.000                     
(0.000)
0.000                     
(0.000)
0.000**                    
(0.000)
No. of Crops Farmed 0.003                     
(0.057)
0.253                     
(0.311)
0.010                     
(0.131)
0.047                     
(0.067)
0.064                     
(0.119)
-0.169                     
(0.280)
0.530**                    
(0.266)
0.023                     
(0.234)
0.501*                    
(0.287)
Outside Y                                                        
(=1 if Business or Work for Pay)
-0.499*                    
(0.287)
-0.930                     
(1.577)
-0.943**                    
(0.473)
0.095                     
(0.226)
-0.282                     
(0.354)
-0.460                     
(0.781)
-0.964                     
(0.660)
-0.938                     
(1.580)
-0.995                     
(0.939)
Pineapple                                                         
(=1 if farms pineapple)
-0.119                     
(0.187)
0.860                     
(1.350)
0.399                     
(0.363)
-0.371                     
(0.247)
-0.241                     
(0.371)
0.396                     
(1.016)
-1.597**                    
(0.706)
0.524                     
(0.887)
-1.074                     
(0.832)
Total Area of HH Plots 0.006                     
(0.005)
0.091**                    
(0.042)
0.002                     
(0.007)
0.003                     
(0.005)
0.003                     
(0.008)
0.038*                    
(0.023)
-0.007                     
(0.015)
0.023                     
(0.035)
0.001                     
(0.021)
Village 1 -0.448                     
(0.333)
-1.390                     
(1.471)
-0.659                     
(0.478)
-0.712*                    
(0.377)
0.118                     
(0.470)
0.590                     
(1.196)
-1.618*                    
(0.916)
-1.788                     
(1.229)
-2.784**                    
(1.204)
Village 2 0.068                     
(0.334)
-0.201                     
(1.616)
-1.337**                    
(0.549)
-0.659*                    
(0.368)
1.425**                    
(0.547)
1.940                     
(1.458)
1.182                     
(0.977)
-2.843*                    
(1.455)
-0.945                     
(1.329)
Village 3 -0.330                     
(0.274)
-2.436                     
(2.123)
-0.764                     
(0.561)
-0.215                     
(0.338)
1.550**                    
(0.610)
2.673*                    
(1.521)
-0.654                     
(0.985)
-2.485                     
(1.826)
-2.546*                    
(1.434)
Constant -0.060                     
(1.034)
-12.47**                    
(5.736)
1.825*                    
(1.014)
0.759                     
(0.763)
-0.564                     
(1.243)
-5.419                     
(4.032)
-1.467                     
(2.204)
-1.934                     
(3.682)
-1.022                     
(3.260)
N 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 107
Variable First Stage

















Clan                                                               
(=1 if Matrilineal Clan)
-0.366                     
(0.243)
- - - - - - -
Bridewealth                                              
(Millions of 1998 Cedis)
-0.005**                    
(0.002)
- - - - - - -
Clan * Bridewealth                                                  
(Millions of 1998 Cedis)
0.049**                    
(0.019)
- - - - - - -
Asymmetry Husband's Farm Y                                
(Std. Dev. from Mean)
- -2.635*                    
(1.572)
-0.057                     
(0.731)
48.65*                    
(27.98)
6.367                     
(10.36)
0.323                     
(0.773)
0.169                     
(0.458)
0.119**                    
(0.053)
No. Plots of Husband Harvested 
by Husband 
0.070                     
(0.055)
0.236                     
(0.226)
0.016                     
(0.115)
1.710                     
(4.647)
-7.545**                    
(3.422)
0.090                     
(0.060)
0.186**                    
(0.094)
0.011                     
(0.013)
No. Plots of Wife Harvested by 
Wife 
-0.268**                    
(0.109)
-1.406*                    
(0.794)
-0.428                     
(0.288)
16.56*                    
(9.659)
6.029                     
(9.079)
0.002                     
(0.167)
0.137                     
(0.175)
0.032                     
(0.028)
Wife School Level                                               
(=1 if Secondary or Higher)
-0.274                     
(0.210)
0.257                     
(0.713)
0.127                     
(0.438)
2.384                     
(19.89)
17.10                     
(11.64)
0.279                     
(0.229)
0.581                     
(0.400)
0.086                     
(0.057)
Husband School Level                                                 
(=1 if Primary or Illiterate)
-0.700*                    
(0.412)
-3.829                     
(2.456)
0.649                     
(0.716)
4.429                     
(36.77)
0.000                     
(19.49)
0.318                     
(0.617)
0.221                     
(0.520)
0.090                     
(0.079)
Husband School Level                             
(=1 if Secondary)
-0.476                     
(0.358)
-1.528                     
(1.595)
0.418                     
(0.562)
-35.30                     
(30.84)
8.602                     
(13.77)
0.560                     
(0.548)
0.146                     
(0.375)
0.101                     
(0.077)
No. Household Members 0.091                     
(0.112)
1.107**                    
(0.505)
-0.198                     
(0.229)
-6.416                     
(12.43)
0.314                     
(6.416)
-0.000                     
(0.126)
-0.304                     
(0.299)
-0.001                     
(0.016)
No. Girls -0.221**                    
(0.098)
0.216                     
(0.485)
-0.070                     
(0.210)
-16.16*                    
(9.252)
-4.742                     
(5.413)
0.079                     
(0.182)
0.020                     
(0.139)
-0.011                     
(0.018)
No. Boys -0.108                     
(0.100)
0.323                     
(0.419)
-0.155                     
(0.160)
-4.564                     
(9.369)
-7.767                     
(4.864)
-0.040                     
(0.086)
-0.025                     
(0.128)
-0.011                     
(0.016)
No. Age < 5 0.101                     
(0.155)
-1.759*                    
(0.989)
0.204                     
(0.396)
33.79*                    
(17.66)
10.20                     
(8.483)
-0.078                     
(0.124)
0.547                     
(0.406)
0.034                     
(0.032)
No. 5 < Age < 14 0.244                     
(0.198)
-0.818                     
(0.714)
0.400                     
(0.320)
8.422                     
(15.99)
3.095                     
(9.038)
0.040                     
(0.134)
0.024                     
(0.319)
-0.000                     
(0.029)
No. Over Age 60 0.311                     
(0.196)
0.507                     
(0.935)
0.466                     
(0.518)
-37.81*                    
(21.20)
-28.06**                    
(13.84)
0.151                     
(0.302)
-0.231                     
(0.329)
-0.073*                    
(0.043)
Years Married -0.017                     
(0.012)
-0.027                     
(0.037)
-0.019                     
(0.023)
1.510                     
(1.056)
0.566                     
(0.727)
0.000                     
(0.009)
0.023                     
(0.015)
0.001                     
(0.002)
Wife's Age 0.027                     
(0.018)
-0.005                     
(0.091)
0.028                     
(0.043)
0.021                     
(2.101)
1.900**                    
(0.870)
-0.010                     
(0.020)
-0.034*                    
(0.019)
0.004                     
(0.005)
Husband's Age
0.000                     
(0.012)
-0.100*                    
(0.058)
-0.011                     
(0.028)
1.359                     
(1.244)
0.010                     
(0.772)
0.003                     
(0.011)
0.035                     
(0.027)
-0.004                     
(0.003)
Husband's Share of HH Y 0.105                     
(0.204)
-1.866                     
(1.307)
0.068                     
(0.524)
-38.27                     
(25.84)
-20.18                     
(20.98)
-0.254                     
(0.256)
-0.376                     
(0.436)
-0.092                     
(0.059)
Total HH Y                                                             
(Thousands of 1998 Cedis)
0.000*                    
(0.000)
0.000**                    
(0.000)
0.000*                    
(6.760)
-0.001                     
(0.002)
-3.333                     
(0.000)
-2.109                     
(5.523)
0.000                     
(3.498)
-0.000                     
(6.183)
No. of Crops Farmed 0.003                     
(0.057)
-0.119                     
(0.255)
-0.133                     
(0.119)
10.58                     
(6.601)
0.000                     
(7.666)
0.005                     
(0.057)
-0.083                     
(0.086)
-0.031**                    
(0.012)
Outside Y                                                        
(=1 if Business or Work for Pay)
-0.499*                    
(0.287)
-1.480                     
(1.002)
0.474                     
(0.506)
-25.48                     
(22.78)
5.971                     
(3.786)
-0.090                     
(0.283)
0.102                     
(0.289)
0.012                     
(0.049)
Pineapple                                                         
(=1 if farms pineapple)
-0.119                     
(0.187)
0.244                     
(0.904)
0.981**                    
(0.445)
26.66                     
(22.75)
1.754                     
(14.46)
-0.237                     
(0.199)
0.225                     
(0.485)
-0.041                     
(0.051)
Total Area of HH Plots 0.006                     
(0.005)
0.062*                    
(0.035)
0.003                     
(0.011)
-0.790*                    
(0.438)
-26.82**                    
(9.046)
0.010                     
(0.007)
-0.002                     
(0.006)
0.000                     
(0.001)
Village 1 -0.448                     
(0.333)
-0.760                     
(1.071)
0.430                     
(0.473)
-26.03                     
(28.16)
-0.310                     
(0.280)
0.239                     
(0.327)
-4.136***                    
(0.813)
-0.145**                    
(0.055)
Village 2 0.068                     
(0.334)
-1.557                     
(1.371)
-1.180                     
(0.731)
-30.93                     
(34.33)
0.000                     
(2.195)
0.459                     
(0.366)
-2.639***                    
(0.733)
-1.358***                    
(0.177)
Village 3 -0.330                     
(0.274)
-1.992                     
(1.232)
0.400                     
(0.642)
-67.52**                    
(34.03)
48.31***                    
(13.52)
0.342                     
(0.445)
-1.029                     
(0.675)
0.028                     
(0.089)
Constant -0.060                     
(1.034)
4.331                     
(3.494)
-0.464                     
(1.457)
58.38                     
(80.53)
-0.420                     
(0.756)
1.518*                    
(0.892)
0.277*                    
(0.142)
N 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 107
Husband Assignable Expenditure Wife's Assignable Expenditure




























Clan                                                               
(=1 if Matrilineal Clan)
-0.508                     
(0.404)
- - - - - - - - - -
Bridewealth                                              
(Millions of 1998 Cedis)
-0.005**                    
(0.002)
- - - - - - - - - -
Clan * Bridewealth                                                  
(Millions of 1998 Cedis)
0.050**                    
(0.021)
- - - - - - - - - -
Asymmetry Husband's Farm Y                                
(Std. Dev. from Mean)
- -0.640                     
(0.421)
-1.478*                    
(0.756)
-2.206                     
(1.628)
-1.785*                    
(1.041)
-1.271                     
(0.963)
0.623                     
(0.768)
63.39*                    
(34.93)
0.500                     
(0.695)
0.592                     
(0.508)
0.177**                    
(0.066)
No. Plots of Husband Harvested 
by Husband 
0.085                     
(0.061)
0.255**                    
(0.113)
0.164                     
(0.134)
0.421                     
(0.323)
-0.033                     
(0.189)
0.116                     
(0.156)
-0.028                     
(0.134)
0.549                     
(5.970)
0.056                     
(0.075)
0.173                     
(0.114)
-0.001                     
(0.011)
No. Plots of Wife Harvested by 
Wife 
-0.328**                    
(0.127)
-0.203                     
(0.176)
-0.319                     
(0.278)
-0.685                     
(0.771)
-0.729*                    
(0.433)
-0.298                     
(0.416)
0.157                     
(0.334)
26.73*                    
(14.81)
0.084                     
(0.252)
0.234                     
(0.268)
0.073**                    
(0.037)
Wife School Level                                               
(=1 if Secondary or Higher)
-0.224                     
(0.211)
0.415*                    
(0.238)
-0.110                     
(0.282)
0.705                     
(1.029)
-0.995                     
(0.622)
0.256                     
(0.385)
0.391                     
(0.488)
-3.231                     
(25.52)
0.337                     
(0.244)
1.061*                    
(0.595)
0.051                     
(0.038)
Husband School Level                                                 
(=1 if Primary or Illiterate)
-1.092**                    
(0.507)
-0.481                     
(0.520)
-3.127**                    
(1.134)
-0.066                     
(2.342)
-3.099*                    
(1.631)
-0.962                     
(1.248)
0.247                     
(1.022)
10.73                     
(50.30)
0.906                     
(0.805)
0.660                     
(0.829)
0.209**                    
(0.105)
Husband School Level                             
(=1 if Secondary)
-0.922*                    
(0.495)
-0.409                     
(0.451)
-2.772**                    
(1.057)
1.327                     
(2.314)
-1.957                     
(1.269)
-0.649                     
(1.063)
0.007                     
(0.876)
-22.54                     
(47.84)
1.009                     
(0.721)
0.419                     
(0.693)
0.155                     
(0.096)
No. Household Members 0.094                     
(0.143)
0.192*                    
(0.115)
0.223                     
(0.243)
1.093                     
(0.871)
-0.282                     
(0.301)
0.517*                    
(0.302)
-0.489*                    
(0.257)
-17.62                     
(17.98)
-0.036                     
(0.166)
-0.434                     
(0.357)
-0.017                     
(0.022)
No. Girls -0.156                     
(0.128)
-0.179                     
(0.151)
-0.060                     
(0.235)
-1.069                     
(0.725)
-0.482                     
(0.305)
-0.538*                    
(0.276)
-0.023                     
(0.200)
-14.15                     
(13.38)
0.196                     
(0.164)
0.103                     
(0.206)
-0.000                     
(0.018)
No. Boys -0.075                     
(0.125)
0.039                     
(0.095)
0.039                     
(0.197)
-0.779                     
(0.723)
-0.242                     
(0.296)
-0.300                     
(0.245)
0.008                     
(0.166)
-7.468                     
(14.59)
0.024                     
(0.105)
-0.002                     
(0.154)
-0.007                     
(0.020)
No. Age < 5 0.058                     
(0.158)
-0.330**                    
(0.160)
-0.398                     
(0.331)
-0.756                     
(0.907)
1.515**                    
(0.508)
-0.094                     
(0.345)
0.526                     
(0.372)
56.54**                    
(21.68)
-0.088                     
(0.179)
0.678                     
(0.543)
0.038                     
(0.025)
No. 5 < Age < 14 0.239                     
(0.217)
-0.030                     
(0.173)
0.096                     
(0.288)
0.504                     
(0.810)
0.662                     
(0.407)
0.064                     
(0.330)
0.507                     
(0.318)
13.39                     
(17.78)
0.084                     
(0.159)
0.017                     
(0.409)
0.014                     
(0.028)
No. Over Age 60 0.087                     
(0.235)
0.110                     
(0.289)
-0.334                     
(0.463)
0.665                     
(1.426)
-0.495                     
(0.701)
0.152                     
(0.564)
0.182                     
(0.558)
-73.25**                    
(33.43)
0.160                     
(0.248)
-0.798*                    
(0.447)
-0.037                     
(0.046)
Years Married -0.019                     
(0.015)
-0.019                     
(0.015)
0.008                     
(0.022)
-0.014                     
(0.061)
0.009                     
(0.033)
-0.017                     
(0.025)
-0.002                     
(0.025)
0.956                     
(1.320)
-0.005                     
(0.012)
0.041**                    
(0.018)
0.002                     
(0.002)
Wife's Age 0.027                     
(0.023)
-0.032*                    
(0.018)
0.012                     
(0.040)
0.192                     
(0.133)
0.164**                    
(0.080)
0.095*                    
(0.056)
0.052                     
(0.037)
1.974                     
(3.020)
-0.010                     
(0.023)
-0.047*                    
(0.024)
-0.000                     
(0.004)
Husband's Age
0.003                     
(0.014)
0.036*                    
(0.022)
-0.041                     
(0.025)
-0.067                     
(0.081)
0.016                     
(0.040)
-0.022                     
(0.029)
-0.010                     
(0.029)
1.199                     
(1.795)
-0.016                     
(0.014)
0.067*                    
(0.038)
-0.000                     
(0.003)
Husband's Share of HH Y 0.062                     
(0.215)
-0.342                     
(0.353)
-0.727                     
(0.476)
-0.587                     
(1.477)
-0.360                     
(0.695)
-0.052                     
(0.539)
0.065                     
(0.540)
-56.29*                    
(30.44)
-0.128                     
(0.328)
-0.780                     
(0.561)
-0.010                     
(0.050)
Total HH Y                                                             
(Thousands of 1998 Cedis)
0.000**                    
(0.000)
0.000**                    
(0.000)
0.000*                    
(8.865)
0.000**                    
(0.000)
0.000                     
(0.000)
0.000**                    
(0.000)
0.000                     
(0.000)
-0.005                     
(0.004)
-0.000                     
(0.000)
-2.466                     
(7.031)
-1.613*                    
(9.308)
No. of Crops Farmed -0.053                     
(0.079)
0.082                     
(0.126)
-0.070                     
(0.163)
-0.299                     
(0.414)
0.452*                    
(0.264)
-0.072                     
(0.172)
-0.329**                    
(0.127)
11.74                     
(9.535)
-0.040                     
(0.059)
-0.198*                    
(0.117)
-0.027**                    
(0.013)
Outside Y                                                        
(=1 if Business or Work for Pay)
-0.473                     
(0.287)
-0.682*                    
(0.374)
0.106                     
(0.459)
0.072                     
(1.207)
-1.399*                    
(0.758)
-0.195                     
(0.588)
1.336**                    
(0.521)
-10.98                     
(30.84)
-0.028                     
(0.329)
0.354                     
(0.498)
0.090*                    
(0.055)
Pineapple                                                         
(=1 if farms pineapple)
-0.269                     
(0.270)
0.338                     
(0.381)
-0.526                     
(0.594)
0.088                     
(1.676)
-1.890**                    
(0.944)
-0.114                     
(0.898)
1.383**                    
(0.586)
30.18                     
(35.51)
0.027                     
(0.352)
0.308                     
(0.685)
0.071                     
(0.047)
Total Area of HH Plots 0.006                     
(0.007)
0.001                     
(0.008)
0.018*                    
(0.009)
0.076**                    
(0.033)
-0.021                     
(0.018)
0.023**                    
(0.011)
0.022*                    
(0.013)
-0.612                     
(0.787)
0.014*                    
(0.008)
-0.006                     
(0.011)
0.002*                    
(0.001)
Village 1 -0.534                     
(0.431)
-0.318                     
(0.413)
0.120                     
(0.636)
1.256                     
(1.633)
-1.663*                    
(0.990)
-1.400**                    
(0.709)
1.548**                    
(0.625)
-23.71                     
(40.15)
0.136                     
(0.389)
-4.021***                    
(0.877)
-0.084                     
(0.052)
Village 2 0.079                     
(0.356)
-0.995**                    
(0.497)
1.321**                    
(0.612)
2.210                     
(1.795)
1.008                     
(0.921)
-1.328*                    
(0.758)
-0.746                     
(0.765)
-39.21                     
(40.75)
0.340                     
(0.403)
-2.768**                    
(0.900)
-0.996***                    
(0.121)
Village 3 -0.511                     
(0.368)
-0.240                     
(0.566)
1.214*                    
(0.686)
2.805                     
(2.031)
-0.650                     
(1.088)
-1.858**                    
(0.894)
-0.183                     
(0.761)
-73.96                     
(45.80)
-0.015                     
(0.511)
-0.786                     
(0.876)
-0.140**                    
(0.071)
Constant 0.477                     
(1.380)
0.173                     
(1.071)
2.614*                    
(1.585)
-5.316                     
(5.422)
-1.509                     
(2.409)
-1.009                     
(1.778)
-1.372                     
(1.724)
23.40                     
(111.5)
-0.202                     
(1.053)
0.872                     
(1.848)
0.035                     
(0.177)
N 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80
Husband  Expenditure Wife's Expenditure
Variable First Stage
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